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Gaddy: The Special Fund Doctrine and Revenue Bond Financing in South Car

THE SPECIAL FUND DOCTRINE AND REVENUE BOND
FINANCING IN SOUTH CAROLINA*
Public financing in South Carolina has grown tremendously in the
last two decades. The rapid and steady expansion of the duties of
government in South Carolina has resulted in state agencies and
municipalities entering areas which were once deemed to be the concern only of private enterprise. Also, inflation has contributed its
part toward increasing the cost of government. These conditions
have meant that resort to private capital by state and local government through borrowing must be made more than ever before.
The issuance of millions of dollars of general obligation bonds has
been accomplished in South Carolina by the use of the special fund
doctrine.' Another means of obtaining money for public purposes
since the beginning of the 1930's is by way of revenue bonds, which
2
have had a spectacular growth in all states during the last few years.
The purpose of this article is to discuss revenue bond financing in
South Carolina by first observing the Special Fund Doctrine as a
background for the former and then to point out the constitutional
problems which may arise when revenue bonds are issued.
Revenue bonds, as the term is used herein, are long term debt
obligations issued for public projects secured solely by the revenue
to be derived from the project undertaken. 3 Generally, in states
other than South Carolina, no distinction is made between revenue
bonds and so-called special fund bonds which are obligations payable
solely out of a special fund.4 However, the Special Fund Bond in
South Carolina is actually a general obligation bond, for even though
a special fund is primarily liable, the full faith, credit and taxing
power of the governmental unit issuing the bond is also pledged to
the payment of the debt.5 "Special-general bond" would be a more
descriptive term for the South Carolina Special Fund Bond for it
ONVritten for a Local Government Seminar while a student at Harvard University Law
School.

1. Sinkler, Constitutional Limitations on Public Finance in South Carolina,

3 S. C. L. Q. 803 (1951).

2. Rose, Developments in Revenue Bond Financing, 6 U. FLA. L. Riv. 385

(1953).

3. City of Spartanburg v. Blalock, 223 S.C. 253, 75 S.E. 2d 361, 365 (1953);
15 McQUILLN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIois, § 43-11.

4. See Annot., 72 A.L.R. 687 (1931); 96 A.L.R. 1385 (1935); 146 A.L.R.
328 (1943).
5. E. g., Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E. 153 (1926);
Evans v. Beattie, 137 S.C. 496, 135 S.E. 538 (1926).
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would indicate the debt was a hybrid between a revenue bond and
a general obligation bond.6
The leading case enunciating the Special Fund Doctrine is State
exr rcl. Richards v. Moorer.7 The financing of highway construction
was to be accomplished by the issuance of "evidences of indebted-'
ness" to which were pledged both a special fund created from the
gasoline tax and also the credit of the State. The court held that
bonds secured by the pledge of a fund which might reasonably be
expected to meet the obligations without the levy of a general property tax did not constitute bonded debt within the meaning of the Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that the full faith, credit and taxing power of the State were pledged.
In the Moorer opinion the court states that it has held a number
of times that obligations of the same character as these bonds did
not constitute a bonded debt within the meaning of the constitutional
limitations. 8 Consequently, the origin of the Special Fund Doctrine
9
would seem to be in the earliest of these cases, Lillard v. Melton.
A city issued "certificates of indebtedness" representing debts due
by virtue of an assessment upon abutting property owners for part
of the cost of street improvements. The assessments became liens
upon the property which were pledged to the "certificates of indebtedness". The faith and credit of the city were also pledged to the obligations which could be used for the payment of debts or the obligations could be sold. The liens would presumably protect the city
against loss upon its guaranty. The court did not discuss the ground
for its decision, but held that the liability of the city on the guaranty
of the paving assessments constituted only a contingent obligation
and must be excluded from the constitutional limitations. 10
It is difficult to understand the rationale behind a doctrine holding that obligations for which a municipality, county, or other governmental unit is ultimately liable would not be a "bonded debt" as the
term is used within the Constitution. One readily observes that if
the special fund proves insufficient to meet the payment of the prin6. Virtue, The Public Use of Private Capital: A Discussion of Problems
Related to Municipal Bond Financing, 35 VA. L. Rxv. 285, 292 (1949).
7. 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269 (1929). The court states this proposition in
State ex rel. Roddy v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E. 33 (1951) ; also, see Sinkler, note 1 supra at 317.
8. 152 S.C. at 494, 150 S.E. at 282. These cases are Sullivan v. City Council
of Charleston, 133 S.C. 189, 133 S.E. 340 (1925); Barnwell v. Matthews, 132
S.C. 314, 128 S.E. 712 (1925); McIntyre v. Rogers, 123 S.C. 334, 116 S.E.
277 (1923) ; Brovnlee v. Brook, 107 S.C. 230, 92 S.E. 477 (1917) ; Lillard v.
Melton, 103 S.C. 10, 87 S.E. 421 (1915).
9. Cited in note 8 supra.
10. Id. at 19, 87 S.E. at 425; see State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, 152 S.C.
at 497, 150 S.E. at 283.
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cipal and interest as it becomes due, the bondholder will look to the
general tax funds of the issuer for payment. Quite clearly the effect
of the Special Fund Doctrine is to mitigate the debt limitations designed for the protection of the taxpayers of South Carolina. These
limitations are succinctly stated below.
Article VIII, Section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution provides that no city shall incur a bonded debt which shall exceed eight
per centum of the assessed value of the taxable property within the
town. Article X, Section 5 sets forth an identical eight per cent
limitation for counties, townships, school districts, or other political
subdivisions. The latter section also provides that the aggregate
debt over and upon any territory of the State shall never exceed
fifteen per cent of the value of all taxable property in such territory.1 1
Even if the vigor of these limitations has been lost through the
Special Fund Doctrine a governmental unit may not create bonded
debt in any amount within its discretion simply by first creating a
fund from excise taxes or other moneys and making it primarily
liable for the payment of the debt. The court has recognized the
danger inherent in the Special Fund Doctrine as originally enunciated
for it has now held that the determination of the sufficiency of any
special fund is in the nature of a judicial function.' 2 This decision
would apparently indicate that the court must give its approval upon
the adequacy of any special fund created to secure general obliga,
tion bonds.' 3
The scheme of issuing general obligation bonds which are primarily secured by the pledging of a special fund deemed sufficient to meet
the obligation has now been approved by the court so many timeb
that it will never be modified because of stare decisis and the con,
fusion which would ensue if overturned. Even in the Moorer decision1 4 the court said, "To open the clear declarations of this court
to doubt or question, after these millions of bonds have been issued
in the state in reliance ... upon these decisions, would seem almost
inconceivable." The court again reiterates this view in State e- rel.
Roddy v. Byrnes.15 This was a proceeding wherein Special Fund
Bonds issued for educational purposes and secured primarily by the
11. The court has developed the proposition that the fifteeh per cent debt
limit does not control the incurring of debt for counties, incorporated cities or
towns and common school districts. An analysis of this doctrine would not
,seem to be relevant here. For a discussion of this topic, see Sinkler, op. cit.
supra note 1.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Arthur v. Byrnes, 224 S.C. 51, 77 S.E. 2d 311 (1953).
Sinkler, ConstitutionalLaw, 7 S. C. L. Q. 84 (1954).
152 S.C. at 505, 150 S.E. at 286.
219 S.C. 307, 66 S.E. 2d 33 (1951).
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proceeds of a three per cent sales tax were held to be constitutional.
This latter case is particularly interesting because of other observations which are made by the court. "In final analysis there should in
good morals be little difference between our long-established... Special Fund Doctrine, and the contrary rule prevailing in other jurisdictions." But the court concludes by suggesting the real reason Special
Fund Bonds have been utilized so frequently in South Carolina.
"Nevertheless, the device is highly desirable because bond buyers
pay higher prices for bonds in the nature of general obligations than
for restricted revenue bonds."
Revenue Bond Financing
If the Special Fund Doctrine mitigated the protection offered taxpayers by constitutional debt limitations, the revenue bond, which is
the full flower of the Special Fund Doctrine, completed the annihilation. Soon after the Revenue Bond Act 16 was passed in 1933 the
court held in Cathcart v. Columbia1 7 that revenue bonds, issued by
a city pursuant to the Act, for the purpose of financing the construction of a stadium and payable solely out of revenue derived from the
stadium project were constitutional. Since the city was not liable
for any part of the debt and the general credit of the city was not
pledged, the bonds were not debts within the meaning of the Constitution. The effect of the decision is that none of the constitutional debt limitations upon public financing are applicable to revenue
bonds. Many other decisions have affirmed and approved this proposition.18 One readily observes that in reality the only difference between Special Fund Bonds in South Carolina and revenue bonds is
that payment of the special fund obligation is met through excise
taxes and that payment of the revenue bond is achieved through a
fund created from a fee for services rendered.
Other than circumventing debt limitations, revenue bonds offer
other advantages. This type of financing provides services which
directly and equitably relate benefits to burdens and seemingly at
no cost to the taxpayer who pays only for his individual use and consumption. By emphasizing management, perhaps the powerful economic motives which work well in private enterprise have been utilized.' 9
16. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTrH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 59-361 through 415.
Revenue Bond Act is occasionally referred to herein as "the Act".

The

17. 170 S.C. 362, 170 S.E. 435 (1933).
18. See e. g., McNulty v. Owens, 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425 (1938) ; Park

v.Greenwood County, 174 S.C. 35, 176 S.E. 870 (1934); Roach v. Columbia,
172 S.C. 478, 174 S.E. 461 (1934).
19. Virtue, op. cit. supra note 6, at 293.
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Projects financed by revenue bonds are "self-supporting" in the
sense that general tax funds do not subsidize and underwrite its
operations. Yet to regard the revenue bond as not a debt would be
a most erroneous notion. With the growing reliance of local government upon private capital any failure of the enterprise to support
itself means that the taxpayers of the locality must meet the debt or
else the governmental unit will suffer a significant loss in credit
20
status.
Circumventing debt limitations is only one of the reasons which
the court has suggested to explain why revenue bond financing was
adopted. In 1933 the State was emerging from the throes and financial difficulties of this nation's most severe depression. Taxpayers
were reluctant to burden themselves further by the issuance of general
obligation bonds. The procedure for issuing bonds secured by the
taxing power of the State was cumbersome and time consuming and
funds had to be raised quickly to take advantage of Federal grants. 21'
Indeed, when one considers the immense amount of Federal subsidies for the construction of public buildings, parks, and other projects, Federal aid could very well be the most important factor producing the spectacular growth in the use of revenue bonds.
In Lutler v. Wheeler22 the court held that "the power to borrow
money is not a necessary incident of municipal life and hence does
not exist unless expressly given .

. . ."

Consequently, it would

seem that the General Assembly must explicitly grant the power to
issue revenue bonds to municipalities before this method of public
financing could be utilized. Such authorization was granted by the
passage of the Revenue Bond Act of 193323 which also granted this
power to counties, townships, and other political subdivisions. With
respect to the constitutionality of granting such power to political subdivisions, it is an unquestionable principle that the Legislature has
unlimited powers unless limited by the Constitution. The Constitution does not prohibit the Legislature from authorizing political subdivisions to issue revenue bonds. This proposition is well-established
24
and does not need further mention.
20. For an example where a court outside South Carolina has recognized
that the fate of a revenue bond is vital to the credit status of the municipality,
see Philadelphia v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 358 Pa. 155, 160, 56 A. 2d
99, 101 (1947).
21. City of Spartanburg v. Blalock, 223 S.C. 253, 75 S.E. 2d 361 (1953).
22. 73 S.C. 83, 90, 52 S.E. 874, 876 (1905).
23. See note 16 supra.
24. For cases upholding the power of the General Assembly to authorize
political subdivisions to issue revenue bonds, see, concerning municipalities,
Cathcart v. City of Columbia, note 17 supra; concerning counties, Park v.
Greenwood County, note 18 mtpra; concerning special authorities, Welling v.
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Under the Revenue Bond Act bonds may be issued for the construction and improvement of water, sewer, light and gas systems,
parking facilities, construction of public buildings, and recreational
projects (such as golf courses, swimming pools and parks). 25 All
bonds issued under the Act are secured solely by the revenue to be
derived from the project undertaken.26 To protect the bondholders,
the borrower is required to set up and keep segregated four distinct
accounts out of the gross revenues: (1) a fund for the payment of
principal and interest on the bonds, (2) a fund for the expenses of
operation and maintenance, (3) a fund to provide a reserve for depreciation, and (4) a "Contingent Fund" to provide a reserve for
later improvements and extensions.2 7 The bonds so issued constitute
a lien on the system or project.28 The unit of government involved
is required to covenant that sufficient rates will be maintained to
provide the necessary amounts in the respective funds mentioned
29
above. Yet the rates may be revised as it becomes necessary.
Before issuing bonds the governing body of the borrower must
adopt an ordinance describing the contemplated project and the estimated cost, specifying the amount of bonds to be issued and naming
the maximum rate of interest, as well as the time and place of payment.30
The principal and interest of revenue bonds are tax exempt under
the laws of the State of South Carolina 3l and under the laws of the
32
Federal government.
As a condition of negotiability the Negotiable Instruments Law
requires an instrument to contain an unconditional promise to pay a
sum certain in money.8 3 It further provides that the promise is not
unconditional when it is made to pay out of a particular fund.3 4 In
light of these provisions it is well that the Revenue Bond Act exClinton-Newberry Natural Gas Authority, 221 S.C. 418, 71 S.E. 2d 7 (1952) ;
and concerning townships, Wagner v. Johnson, 223 S.C. 471, 76 S.E. 2d 611

(1953).

25. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 59-365.
26. Id. § 59-410.
27. Id. § 59-402.
28. Id. § 59-392; City of Spartanburg v. Blalock, 223 S.C. 253, 261, 75 S.E.
2d 361, 365 (1953).

29. CODE or LAWS

OF

SOUTH

CAROLINA,

1952 § 59-397.

30. Id. § 59-381.
31. Id. § 59-385.
32. INTERNAL IVENUE CODE, Sec. 103. Also, see Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F. 2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945) ;
and Commissioner v. White's Estate, 144 F. 2d 1019 (2nd Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945), where the principal and interest of revenue bonds
issued by state political subdivisions were held exempt from the Federal income

tax.

33.

CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

1952 § 8-811.

34. Id. § 8-813.
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plicitly provides that revenue bonds shall have all the qualities of
negotiable instruments.8 5
The first question to be determined when considering the validity
of revenue bonds is whether the bonds were issued for a public purpose. While the term "public purpose" can be given no precise definition, local governmental units are not limited to providing only for
the absolute necessities of their citizens, but they may exercise their
36
powers to promote the general welfare.
None of the projects authorized by the Revenue Bond Act have
been disapproved by the court. The more unusual enterprises held
87
a stadium, 8
to be for a public purpose are a natural gas system,

and a parking lot.8 9
Property used for a public purpose may be exempt from taxation
under Article X, Section 1 and Section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution. Likewise this essential feature for the exercise of governmental authority enables the power of eminent domain to be granted
40
to the enterprise.
Industrial Developnent Bonds
In view of the increasing industrial growth of South Carolina and
the eagerness of cities and towns to attract industrial concerns, an
interesting question upon which to speculate is whether a municipality in South Carolina may issue revenue bonds to finance the
construction of industrial plants which will be leased to a private
concern? The bonds would be secured solely by the rental from the
building and land involved. What are the considerations relevant in
determining the constitutionality of this plan?
Since municipal powers have always been construed strictly and
are denied unless expressly granted, 4 1 statutory authority from the
General Assembly must first be found. Assuming that a special enabling act grants the authority to the municipality to issue industrial
development bonds, then, the most formidable objection would seem
to be that this was not an exercise of municipal powers for a public
purpose. This obstacle has been overcome in other jurisdictions, for
such plans, whereby revenue bonds were to be issued for the con35. Id. § 59-384.
36. Cf., Marshall v. Rose, 213 S.C. 428, 49 S.E. 2d 720 (1948).
37. Welling v. Clinton Natural Gas Authority, 221 S.C. 418, 71 S.E. 2d 7
(1952).
38. Cathcart v. City of Columbia, 170 S.C. 362, 170 S.E. 435 (1933).
39. Sammon v. City of Beaufort, 225 S.C. 490, 83 S.E. 2d 153 (1954).
40. See note 39 supra;McNulty v. Owens, 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425 (1938);
Benjamin v. Housing Authority, 198 S.C. 79, 15 S.E. 2d 737 (1941).
41. Luther v. Wheeler, supra at 6.
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struction of a facility to be leased to private industry in return for
a rental which becomes sole security for the bonds, have been upheld
by the highest court of other southern states.42 The consensus of
modem legislative and judicial thinking is to broaden the scope of
activities which may be classed as involving a public purpose. 43 Economic welfare is one of the main concerns of the city, state and
federal governments. This is manifested by the social security programs of both state and nation, low cost housing developments, old
age insurance, and numerous other enterprises. All are illustrative of
the modern concept of public purpose.
The South Carolina Constitution, Article VIII, Section 8, recognizes that the location of a manufacturing establishment is a public
advantage. It states: "cities and towns may exempt from taxation
by general or special ordinance, except for school purposes, manufactories established within their limits, for five successive years
from the time of the establishment of such manufactories."
Opposition to the public nature of the plan could find support in
Bolton v. Wharton44 where the court held invalid an attempt by a
city to underwrite stock in a private silk manufacturing corporation
by the issuance of notes to which the taxing power of the city was
pledged. In ascertaining what is a public purpose within the power
to tax, such benefits as will accrue from increased taxable values
and increased impetus to commercial life of the community will not
suffice. Yet for two reasons this case should be inapplicable to a
plan for financing a private industrial company through the issuance
of revenue bonds. First, there is no pledge of the faith and credit
of the issuing municipality in our proposed scheme. Secondly, the
Bolton case really concerns a situation where a municipality attempted
to issue bonds without prior statutory authority.
A path is offered, in Haesloup v. City Council of Charleston,45 by
which it may be found with ease that industrial development bonds
are issued for a public purpose. A municipality granted land to a
private person on condition that a hotel be erected thereupon. The
court held that this was not a donation of public lands to private par42. See Ky. Rrv. STAT. SeCs. 103.200-103.280 (Cum. Supp. 1951) ; Faulconer
V. Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W. 2d 80 (1950).
ALA. CODE TIT. 37, Sees. 815.830 (Cum. Supp. 1951) ; Opinion of the Justices,
254 Ala. 506, 49 So. 2d 175 (1950) ; ALA. CODE TIT. 37, Secs. 511(20)-511(32)
(CGum. Supp. 1951) ; Newberry v. Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952);
Inrce Opinions of the Justices, 256 Ala. 162, 53 So. 2d 840 (1951).
Tj.NN. CODE ANx., §§ 4406.53a-4406.53n (Williams Cum. Supp. 1952); Holly
v. Elizabethton, 193 Tenn. 46, 241 S.W. 2d 1001 (1951).
43. 37 Am. Ju., Municipal Corporations§ 132.
44. 163 S. C. 242, 161 S.E. 454, 86 A.L.R. 1101 (1931).
45. 123 S.C. 272, 115 S.E. 596 (1920).
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ties, but rather it was a public purpose, supported by a contractual
consideration in the form of substantial returns on tax revenues. The
real inquiry should be whether the proposed conveyance of real estate amounted to a breach of the trust that is imposed upon the city
council "to use and dispose of the property in a way conducive to
the welfare and advantage of the said city and its inhabitants. '46 In
the Haesloup case the court indicates that when the governmental
powers of taxation or of eminent domain are not authorized, the
definition of a "public purpose" is broadened to include activities
which may not be a "public purpose" if the powers of taxation or
eminent domain have been granted.
Industrial development bonds are designed to produce further industry within a community, thereby increasing the commerce, welfare
and advantages of the citizens of that area. The taxing power nor
eminent domain power would be given to the private company directly aided by such bonds. Consequently, industrial development bonds
should be held to be for a public purpose.
Article X, Section 6 of the South Carolina Constitution states:
"The credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned for the benefit of any individual, company, associations or corporations . .

".

This provision would not be violated since neither the taxing power
nor credit of the municipality would be pledged to the obligations.
The city would not be responsible for any of the debts of the corporation nor could general public funds ever be used.
Perhaps the strongest deterrent against establishing a plan for industrial development bonds is their disapproval by the investment
banking world 47 and the promised uncertainty as to their future immunity from Federal taxation. This past year the United States
House of Representatives approved legislation disallowing, to private
businesses, rental payments made to state or local governmental units
for the use of property acquired by the governmental unit by the issuance of industrial development bonds after February 8, 1954.48
This proposed section to the Internal Revenue Code was struck by
the Senate Finance Committee so that nothing ever came of the
amendment. 49 Previously, the House Ways and Means Committee
had discussed taxing the interest on certain municipal development
46. 123 S.C. at 283, 115 S.E. at 600.
47. The Investment Banking Association of the United States at its annual
session in December, 1951, sharply condemned the issuance of bonds to finance
plants for use by private manufacturing concerns. 6 NATIONAL MUNICIPAl.
Rzrmw 319 (1952).
48. H. A. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 65.
49. H. R. Rii. No. 2543, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 33.
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bonds.50 In 1953 the House of Representatives considered, but did
not approve, a bill which would render taxable all income derived
from non-general obligations of local governments issued to finance
"non-public enterprises".5 1 The primary advantage which industrial
development bonds have is that their income is exempt from taxation.
The observation is apparent that the future tax-exempt status of
such bonds is in danger of being destroyed even if constitutional barriers in South Carolina were surmounted.
The questions of whether revenue bonds were issued for a public
purpose and whether revenue bonds come within statutory debt limitations have been considered. Attention is now directed toward problems which are more likely to arise in the future.
Future Problems in Revenue Bond Financing
The Revenue Bond Act provides that the authorizing ordinance
must create a statutory lien upon the project in favor of the bondholders. However, this lien may not be construed to give the bondholder authority to compel the sale of the project or any part thereof.52
In Cathcart v. City of Columbia5s the argument was made, that
revenue bonds issued to finance a stadium were unconstitutional because the statutory lien created upon the stadium was inconsistent
"with the ownership of public property and that a municipality has
no power to subject its property to the possibility of its being taken
over by the bondholders". The court rejected this argument saying,
The plaintiff has cited no provision of the Constitution, and we
know of none, which either forbids the Legislature to create
such a lien, or denies to a municipal corporation or a county
the right to so do in its exercise of the powers granted it by
54
legislative authority.
In Saminons v, City of Beaufort55 revenue bonds were issued to
finance on-street parking meters and an off-street parking lot. A
covenant gave bondholders a lien on the "parking facilities" and provided that upon default, a receiver might be appointed to operate
both the on-street and off-street parking projects. The court distinguished the Cathcartcase from this situation and held the covenant
unconstitutional. It felt that here was an attempt to create a lien
50. For additional comment, see 4 MUNIcIPAL. LAW
Jan., Feb., and Sept. 1954 issues.)
51. H. R. 2734, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
52. CoDm or LAws oV SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 59-391.
53. 170 S.C. at 369, 170 S.E. at 437.
54. Id. at 369, 170 S.W. at 438.
55. 225 S.C. 490, 83 S.E. 2d 153 (1954).
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upon "on-street parking facilities, an essential governmental function". However, objections to the lien were not fully stated. "It
would hardly be suggested that a municipality may mortgage its
streets or delegate to a court the power to regulate traffic. This
covenant is obviously invalid so far as it pertains to on-street parking
facilities." 5 6
Apparently, if the project financed by revenue bonds is considered
an "essential governmental function", then the statutory lien authorized by the Revenue Bond Act is invalid. As it is generally
57
agreed that the answerability of the property protects the investor,
the marketing of a revenue bond without this lien would probably
be unsuccessful. However, thus far there is no indication outside of
the Sammons case as to which projects authorized by the Revenue
Bond Act can be considered an "essential governmental function".
In the Sammons case perhaps the greater difficulty lay with the
covenant under which a receiver would have power not only to operate facilities and collect revenues but also to determine rates and
charges on the police power theory of on-street parking meters. The
court possibly felt that to enable a judicial officer to fix parking meter
charges on that basis is to entrust him with the police power. If the
court was more concerned with the power of a receiver upon default
of the bonds, than with the power of bondholders under the statutory
lien to compel the performance of all duties of the officials of the
borrower as Well as other rights given to the bondholders, then the
receivership problem may be eliminated by restricting the duties of
53
a receiver to routine administration and collection of revenues.
Revenue bonds are frequently used as a method of financing parking facilities. Such projects are constitutional under the police power
of the local governmental unit. However, the police power may not
be used for general revenue purposes. 59 In Owens v. Owens,
Mayor,60 revenue bonds were secured by the pledge of proceeds
from on-street parking meters. The court rejected the argument of
the plaintiff that the purpose of the city was to raise revenue under
the guise of a police regulation. Insufficient facts were established
to show that revenue collected from the parking meters exceeded the
cost of this method of regulating traffic and the use of the streets.
The court held that "the city should be allowed to make a charge
56. Id. at 158.
57. See note 6 supra.
58. 4 MUNICIPAL LAW Smvicn L=rER, Sept. 1954, page 3.
59. Owens v. Owens, Mayor, 193 S.C. 260, 8 S.E. 2d 339 (1940) ; Sammons
v. City of Beaufort, 225 S.C. 490, 83 S.E. 2d 153 (1954) ; 25 AM. JuR., Highways §§ 182, 184.
60. 193 S.C. 260, 8 S.E. 2d 339 (1940).
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large enough to cover the expense which may reasonably be expected". 6 1 In the Sammons case a municipality was held to be
validly exercising its police power by using revenue from on-street
parking meters to defray the cost of off-street parking facilities.
Also, the municipality was allowed to create a financial "cushion" for
the payment of the revenue bonds if the revenue collected was in
excess of the immediate expense.
One inference to be drawn from the Owens and Sainvions cases
is that the court must give its approval upon whether revenue received under an exercise of the police power constitutes a reasonable
charge in relation to the expense of the activity. In some respects the
attitude of the court is similar to its position toward Special Fund
Bonds where it determines the sufficiency of the fund created to sup62
port the bonds.
The local governing body may not covenant to make it a crime for
a person to use the services provided by the revenue bond project
without payment of the established charge and to covenant further
to keep the sanction in effect during the life of the bonds. In the
Sammons case, where there was this type of covenant, the court indicated this view by saying, "No city council may be empowered to
63
enact any kind of criminal ordinance and make same irrevocable."
No reasons were given for this holding. The views of the highest
court in a sister State, North Carolina, are not helpful even though
64
the result is substantially the same. In Britt v. City of Wilmington
a penalty provision was held invalid on the ground that a regulation
as to a purely proprietary activity may not be enforced by criminal
prosecution. However, South Carolina recognizes no distinction between governmental and proprietary activity65 and this latter holding
in the Samnons case remains unexplainable as to why punitive sanctions may not be employed to protect public property in its proper use.
The true type of revenue producing facility is a project or system
operated by the body issuing the bonds, and charges are made against
members of the public to whom the services are furnished. Such projects are sometimes described as "self-liquidating". 66 This classification would include such facilities as water, electric, and gas systems, bridges, toll roads, ferries, hospitals, and athletic stadiums.
193 S.C. at 266, 8 S.E. 2d at 341.
See Arthur v. Byrnes, note 12 supra.
83 S.E. 2d at 158.
236 N.C. 446, 73 S.E. 2d 289 (1952).
Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911) ; Farrow
iv. City of Columbia, 169 'S.C. 373, 168 S.E. 852 (1933); Looper v. City of
Easley, 172 S.C. 11, 172 S.E. 705 (1934).
66. See Rose, note 2 supra at 394.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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However, the Revenue Bond Act specifically authorizes bonds to be
issued for the acquisition of facilities such as city halls, courthouses,
fire stations and other public buildings. 6 7 These facilities do not
produce income from the public for the rendition of a particular service. South Carolina case law concerning this latter type of public
project is very scant.
One method of financing the non-revenue type facility would be to
create two public bodies; one to acquire and own the facility and to
issue revenue bonds for that purpose, payable out of rentals due to
be paid by the other public body under a lease of the facility. The
lease would run for the life of the bonds, and the amount of rent
contracted to be paid would cover operational expenses and debt
service requirements on the bonds. The lessee pays the rentals out
of tax moneys or other revenues not derived from the operation of the
facility.
In Bollin v. Graydon6 s there was a plan of financing a courthouse
which wi¢as very similar to the one outlined in the preceding paragraph.
A courthouse building commission was created by the General Assembly 69 with authority to construct a courthouse for the purpose of
conducting public business of the county. Each county officer was
to maintain offices in the building where business pertaining to the
office was to be conducted. Fees were to be collected for certain
functions performed by the officers. The fees were to be turned over
to the treasury of the county as general county revenues and would
constitute a fund securing revenue bonds issued to finance the building. A contract was then signed between the building commission
and a county board of commissioners under which the courthouse
was leased to the latter for the term of the life of the bonds at an
annual rental estimated to be sufficient to retire them. The court
held that each board of commissioners was a separate corporate body
which had the power to enter into the rental agreement, and that the
pledging of fees was not an attempt to delegate to the bondholders
power to exercise the taxing power of the county.
The court in the Bollin case did not discuss the following problem
which may arise later in a similar situation. Even if the bonds themselves are not a public debt, an argument may be made that the lease
constituted a debt of the lessee, within the meaning of constitutional
debt limitations, for the aggregate of all rentals provided for in the
lease. Courts of other jurisdictions have held that long term leases
67.

CODE O LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

1952 § 59-365.

68. 177 S.C. 374, 181 S.E. 467 (1935).
69. 39 ST. AT LAI(on 1089, Act June 5, 1935.
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of this nature are debts only to the extent that the subject matter of
the contract has been furnished by one of the parties. In other words
a distinction is drawn betiveen an absolute debt created at once and
so-called "future indebtedness". 70 This latter rule is known as the
"VValla-Walla Doctrine". 7 1 It was enunciated in a case involving a
municipal contract for a supply of water running over a period of
years payable in annual installments. Whether the lessee acquires
title at the expiration of the lease is another factor which has frequently been deemed crucial.72 In view of the tendency of the court
to find debt obligations not within the constitutional meaning of debt,
probably the "Walla-'Walla Doctrine" would be applied.
If the court refuses to accept the "Walla-Walla Doctrine", then
non-revenue facilities can be financed by a lease for a short period,
perhaps one or two years, with periodic options of renewal granted
to the lessee continuing over the entire maturity of the bonds issued
to finance the facility.73 Many issues of revenue bonds made payable
solely from the proceeds of one of these short-term leases have been
marketed advantageously. 74
An alternative method of financing non-revenue producing facilities would be to carry the lease plan one step further. Instead of
having two public bodies, as in the conventional lease plan, the
municipality or other unit could retain title to the facility and issue
its own securities for the acquisition thereof, payable out of so-called
revenues from the facility, and then covenant to provide those revenues by making periodic payments from other sources payable into a
special fund created to service the bonds. The payments into the
special fund would be called "rents" and should be equal to the reasonable value of the use of the facility. While in essence this plan
means that the issuing body is making payments called "rents" for
the use of a facility owned by it, the scheme would seem to amount
only to the traditional Special Fund Bond without the pledge of the
full faith, credit and taxing power of the issuing body. Only the project itself and the revenues from the use thereof would be answerable
75
to the bondholder.
Many states do not'permit the pledge of revenues from sources
other than income which can be directly traced to the particular pro70. See Rose, note 2 supra at 395.

71. Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898).
72. Farguhar v. McAlevy, 142 Pa. 233, 21 Atl. 811 (1891).

73. E. g., Opinion of the Justices, 147 Me. 410, 79 A. 2d 753 (1951).
74. Rose, note 2 supraat 396.
75. For an example of this plan of financing, see Martin County v. Cassady,
307 Ky. 728, 212 S.W. 2d 281 (1948).
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ject which was financed by revenue bonds. 76

However, the South

Carolina court has adopted a slightly different view on this point. One
of the projects to be financed by revenue bonds, in Cathcartv. Columbia, was an enlargement of a city water works system. The bonds
were to be secured by a pledge not only of revenues from additions
to the waterworks system, but also the present revenues of the water
department. The plaintiff contended that the effect of the loan would
be that the city would be required to replace such revenues by taxation and therefore the loan would be a debt within the meaning of
the Constitution. The court rejected this argument 77 without stating reasons of its own, but relied upon the language of an Illinois
decision, Ward v. City of Chicago.78 In that case, certificates of indebtedness payable solely from revenues derived from the city's waterworks system, even though the debts were created to finance the enlargement of a plant, were held not to constitute a debt within constitutional limitations. By relying upon the Ward case the court would
seem to have given its approval to a revenue bond being "sweetened"
by a pledge of revenues derived from a source other than the project
itself.
Conclusion
The Special Fund Doctrine in South Carolina has mitigated constitutional debt limitations, but its dangers have been eased by the
court's holding that the determination of the special fund is a judicial function. Revenue bonds constitute the final ramification of
the Special Fund Doctrine. It is well-established that revenue bonds
are not a debt within the meaning of constitutional debt limitations.
One may also conclude, with a substantial degree of certainty, that
projects authorized by the Revenue Bond Act in South Carolina are
valid public purposes.
Industrial development bonds, if and when issued, would probably
be constitutional, but the future of their tax exempt status should
be a primary factor in their consideration.
Some uncertainty exists with respect to the validity of the statutory lien given to bondholders, particularly if the project acquired
comes within the classification of an "essential governmental function".
76. See, e. g., Opp v. Donaldson, 230 Ala. 189, 163 So. 232 (1935) ; State
ex rel. Public Institutional Bldg. Authority v. Griffith, 135 Ohio St. 604, 22
iN.E. 2d 200 (1939) ; Contra: Schmeller v. Ft. Lauderdale, 38 So. 2d 36 (Fla.
1948).
77. 170 S.C. at 372, 170 S.E. at 439.
78. 342 Ill. 167, 172, 173 N.E. 810, 812 (1930).
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The financing of non-revenue producing facilities has aroused
little concern thus far, but various plans by which such projects can
be financed should be constitutional.
The courts would also seem to approve of the financing of the
extension of existing facilities by the pledging of funds derived from
the existing facilities as well as the extension itself.
CLIFFORD
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